Executing Emergence!

Ron Cottam, Willy Ranson & Roger Vounckx

Abstract

            Starting from a "ball-and-stick" system model reminiscent of that used for chemical molecular structures we evaluate the relationships between a multiplicity of quasi-internalist and quasi-externalist viewpoints. Purely internal and purely external positions appear to be impossible in this context, if any sense of understanding is to be maintained. This corresponds to recent developments in the application of semiosis to less-than-animate aspects of nature, where negociation between internal and external interpretants is of vital importance in establishing stable relationships.

            System properties viewed from an internal sub-systemic position can be simplistically divided into direct and indirect types, where it is impossible to satisfactorily integrate the two without resorting to quasi-internalist-externalist positions. Any attempt to match a complete "intrinsic" internal systemic model to a "rationalized" external abstraction results in incoherences which correspond to those phenomena usually referred to as emergences.

            Progressive increase in the "ball-and-stick" systemic size from an initial two sub-systems implies a progressive increase in the indirect part of the systemic definition which follows the square of the number of sub-systems. Progressively, with increase in size, systemic character therefore becomes more and more indirect, and less completely characterizable from an individual sub-systemic position. We attribute the nature of emergence to a combination of this co-evolution of direct and indirect characters with the simplistic and unreal adoption of entirely "internalist" or "externalist" viewpoints.

            Newtonian mechanics begins to experience difficulties with systems which consist of only three sub-elements (the three-body problem). It is instructive to note that this corresponds to the smallest system which would suffer from the above-mentioned direct-indirect comprehensional confusion. We suggest that this confusion is responsible for the apparent magic of emergence, and that it ultimately results in the traditional split between mind (approximating to indirect systemic definition) and matter (direct definition).
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